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sume that his philosophy has nothing to do with his greatness. For even if the world should unanimously decide that Hardy's conception of life is totally wrong, it would have to admit that this conception had been of great use in focusing the author's powers—that without it he could hardly, in his time, have done so successfully his noble work of combating false views, revealing truths of character, and broadening sympathy.

Apart from the fact that he takes the ultimate truth of Hardy's philosophy very much for granted, Mr. Child has produced an excellent critical study of his author. Considering its brevity, it is remarkably adequate. Mr. Child, himself a writer of novels, is able to enter into the spirit of the older novelist, who is yet of his own time, and to interpret him with a clear understanding of the point of view both of the writer of fiction and of the reader. His book is not a mere persuasive introduction to Hardy's works, but a just and able analysis of them.

THE VANDAL OF EUROPE. By Wilhelm Mühlön, former director in Krupp's. Translated by William McPherson. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918.

In this year of the Great War it is natural to suppose that no well-informed person can well be surprised by any fresh revelation of German mendacity. Yet Dr. Mühlön, a former director in the great Krupp corporation, records instances of deliberate and stupid falsehood that may startle into acrid mirth even the reader most satiated with evidence regarding the nauseous immorality of the German Government.

For example, the Germans have industriously circulated the wildest fables about atrocities said to have been committed by Russian soldiers in East Prussia. In Germany these tales have been implicitly believed even when they ran to the most frightful extremes,—as when it was said that the Russians made a practice of nailing the hands of little country children to tables. And yet, as Dr. Mühlön testifies from personal knowledge, a high commission investigated these stories and found them all lies. "The commission admits—naturally, not publicly—that the Russians have not been so ruthless as one might expect them to be in war. The East Prussian population and local authorities have frequently expressed themselves very gratefully and very flatteringly in regard to the behavior of the Russians."

Manifestly it is painful to a man of honor and intelligence to live under a government that deals habitually in clumsy falsehoods—to say nothing of committing other violations of the decalogue; but it is even more painful to realize that one's compatriots are the sort of people who believe, and like to believe, malicious lies—to say nothing of giving a ready approval to other kinds of wickedness. "Germans," cries Dr. Mühlön, "hide your head. In your boorish simplicity you are a menace to the world."

After all, the most significant—and the bitterest—parts of Dr. Mühlön's book are those which have reference, not to the Government, but to the people.

We have come to realize that the German Government and the

German people are one. But what is the explanation of this unanimity? Is it merely that the rulers of Germany are master hypnotists, whose will by some kind of psychic force overrules the conscience of twenty-five millions of people? Some such romantic view would doubtless be pleasing to those who insist upon seeing good in everything; but the ugly truth, as it may be deduced from Dr. Mühlön's diary, is simply that the people are upon as low a moral level as is their government. To say that they are simply besotted is not, of course, to excuse them for what they have done; it is simply to express the pious hope that, being human creatures and not "goblins damned," they may some time repent.

At the beginning of the war, the German people were under no illusions as to their standing before the world. Material greatness, they knew that their nation had attained; greatness of a higher sort, they were aware, was not ascribed to them by other people. They suffered in self-esteem from the opinion that was held of them abroad. At the same time they could scarcely endure the burdens of taxation and regulation imposed upon them at home.

"No wonder," writes Dr. Mühlön, "that the German proletariat finally welcomed a test; that it saw itself rid of an Alp-like burden when it realized: 'Now things have broken loose, and we shall soon know where we really stand.'"

"One can almost say that what the result might be was wholly subordinated to this deeper thought: 'Anyway, we couldn't have gone on like this much further; clarity must come; the burden must be shaken off. If it goes badly for us, then we shall start again, with new bearings, more modest, simpler, less intolerant, better. If it goes well, then we the people have done the work. We can demand that we shall lead in the future a life more worth living, and that we shall come to an understanding with our present enemies, as soon as these enemies, who now surround us, misjudge us, and plot against us, are overthrown.'"

There is here, to be sure, an implication that the people of Germany sincerely believed that they were surrounded by enemies who misjudged them and plotted against them. But the "deeper thought" was simply: Let the Government go ahead with any programme that it deems likely to succeed. Let Belgium be ravaged; let France be bled white; let England be enslaved; let Europe be overrun. We have been told that we are a superior race, a chosen people. Very likely this is true. At any rate, we accept it provisionally. If it proves untrue—if we fail—then, at any rate, we shall be able to insist upon more power, more comfort, at home. If we succeed, we shall not only gain these advantages at home, but we shall command the respect of the whole world.

A very characteristic assumption, this last—that the respect of the world can be won by violence! "I cannot too often din it into the ears of Germans," writes Dr. Mühlön in weary disgust, "that what is lacking in moral superiority cannot be replaced by force."

The nature of its acquiescence in the plans of the Imperial Government characterizes the German people as a whole; but the truth is brought home more pointedly by the study of particular traits.

Where, outside Kaiserdom, could the following instance of bigotry be matched?

"A gentleman who had long been in intimate touch with the best French literary and artistic circles; whose life and home bear the impress of French taste, and who on that account, was not in the least a leader of opinion in Germany; who through ancestry, connections, and position is a representative of the most refined class of Germans"—this gentleman fully credited the report that a French physician with two disguised French officers had been caught trying to poison a well in Metz with cholera bacilli. When it was objected that the report was accompanied by no sufficient evidence of its truth, he replied: "I believe it without proof. The French are like that." And when the official denial came, he said: "It's true all the same. They deny it only for the sake of preventing a panic."

To what other body of disciplined soldiers—with the possible exception of Turks and Bulgarians—could one not give a higher character than Dr. Mühlön gives to the German soldier?

"Generally speaking, one may say of the German soldier that he is normally good-natured and is not disposed to do injury to harmless people, so long as he finds no obstacles put in his prescribed way. But once disturbed, he becomes frightful, because he lacks any higher capacity of discrimination; because he merely does his duty and recognizes no such thing as individual conscience; and besides, when he is excited, becomes at once blind and super-nervous."

Let us compare the German soldier, as thus portrayed, with the Russian soldier, not as the Russian has proved himself to be, but as we might excusably have conceived him to be before we knew him so well as we do now. The Russian soldier has proved remarkably humane. If, however, the ignorant Russian peasant with a gun in his hand had shown himself stupidly ferocious and incorrigibly rapacious, we might have found this entirely natural. But no one would ever have suggested that the Russian soldier "recognized no such thing as individual conscience"!

When people rejoice over monstrous villainies like the ravaging of Belgium, must it not be supposed that they have suffered a moral lesion? No other view is open. It will not do to protest that popular rejoicing in Germany over the crime of Belgium was government-inspired. On the contrary, it is part of the popular creed to worship success, however attained.

"The Germans have faith in their numerical superiority and their better military equipment," wrote Dr. Mühlön, soon after the fall of Liège. "They do not believe, in fact, that they will win through bravery, strength, skill, or any other special moral quality. They are satisfied as soon as they may hope to have superior numbers. . . . It does not occur to them to be ashamed of their great superiority in numbers when they use it to crush a weak opponent like Belgium. They celebrate their achievements the more loudly and joyously, the greater their assurance is of overwhelming strength. They are like barbarians, who become intoxicated with victory, even if it be achieved at the expense of defenseless opponents. With wild hurrahs they are already distributing in their tents the treasures and the men taken as booty."

And finally, what can be thought of the moral status of the German people when it is possible for a private citizen gravely to argue, in a letter to a responsible newspaper, that the German Government is not

employing money in sufficient quantities or on a sufficiently elaborate scale for the corruption of Holland!

Verily, than this book of Dr. Mühlon's one could scarcely have better testimony to the essential "Hunnishness of the Hun."

BRITAIN AFTER THE PEACE. By Brougham Villiers. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1918.

The problem of reconstruction after the war is, in the view of Mr. Brougham Villiers, a revolutionary problem. Britain, as a result of war conditions, is even now undergoing a revolution; changes affecting the social and economic life of the country have been going on with unexampled rapidity. And the post-war conditions will press harder than the war conditions themselves. The flooding of the labor market with millions of demobilized soldiers will bring about an economic, and perhaps a political, crisis of serious magnitude.

The only way in which to avoid disaster is, according to Mr. Villiers, first, to provide work for everybody, and secondly, to distribute the burden of taxation in such a way that it will bear equitably upon all. Mr. Villiers has devised a scheme which he believes will accomplish both these ends in the simplest possible way.

The returned soldiers must be provided for—that is axiomatic. Neither their own welfare nor the welfare of society would be duly protected if they were simply turned out of the army to find their places as best they could in a disturbed economic order. They must, therefore, be kept in the army until remunerative work—work sufficiently well paid to prevent any general lowering of wages and of the standard of living—can be found for them. Then they should be left free either to accept this work or to remain in the army. Probably the vast majority of them would prefer the former alternative.

This plan, to be sure, involves a heavy burden upon the tax-payers. But the burden is unavoidable. Somehow the war must be paid for, and part of the price is the cost of economic readjustment. This will have to be paid anyhow—if not in taxes then in privation and in a lowered standard of living. The only debatable question concerning this expense is that of its distribution.

There can be no fear, argues Mr. Villiers, that the proletariat will not pay its due share of the cost of the war. The working classes will pay, if not otherwise, through the increased cost of food. The *rentier*—the man with a fixed capital invested at a fixed rate of interest—will not escape, because, owing to the inflation of currency, his money will buy only half as much after the war as it would before. The business man will pay his share, because, to say nothing of income taxes and excess-profits taxes, war-time gains will in a large measure be wiped out by peace-time losses. The only person, therefore, who is likely not to bear his due proportion of the loss caused by the war, and who may even make a profit out of the war, is the landlord.

Any plan of reorganization ought, then, to provide work for the demobilized troops and at the same time to make the landlord pay his share of the loss which the war has entailed upon the country.

But of what sort should be the work that is to be thrown open to